Africa at the centre of global cyber conflict: Threats and strategic vulnerabilities in 2025

Africa is stepping into a decisive phase in its digital evolution—one that is marked not only by unprecedented technological growth but by an equally unprecedented rise in cyber hostility. The 2025 State of Cyber Security Report positions the continent not as a peripheral victim of international cyber operations,  but as the main theatre of competition between state and non-state actors. As digital infrastructure expands, adversaries aligned with China, Russia, Iran and various independent cybercriminal networks are exploiting system weaknesses, governance gaps, and unprotected digital terrain. This convergence of global geopolitical rivalry and Africa’s rapid digital acceleration has caused  the continent the new frontline of cyber espionage, disinformation warfare, ransomware attacks, supply-chain infiltration, and credential theft.

The rise of state-backed espionage: China, Russia and Iran expand their footprint

A significant recent trend is the heightened operational scale of Chinese cyber campaigns across Africa. While Chinese cyber activity in the region previously centered on intelligence gathering, diplomatic surveillance, and telecommunications monitoring, the Sharp Dragon operation marks a distinct strategic escalation. This shift involves Chinese operators embedding long-term, covert access through the deployment of Cobalt Strike beacons within African government entities. Their objective is now broader: to exfiltrate classified data and profile internal administrative structures. This demonstrates an evolution in intelligence priorities—moving beyond immediate surveillance to acquiring deep, structural knowledge of African political systems. This more comprehensive approach strongly aligns with China’s significant economic and governance engagement in Africa, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative and its extensive investments in digital infrastructure.

Chinese-affiliated cyber actors are escalating their operations in Africa. Groups like Water Sigbin 8220 have been observed exploiting widespread vulnerabilities in emerging markets, specifically targeting legacy systems running Oracle WebLogic. Furthermore, Chinese groups are increasingly leveraging ORB networks—vast clusters of compromised IoT devices—to target critical infrastructure, including African telecom operators and government service platforms. This strategic approach, which heavily relies on telecom interception, parallels the established U.S.–China cyber conflict dynamics in Southeast Asia. Such interception serves as a significant tool for strategic dominance, offering substantial leverage over diplomatic communications and foreign policy channels in the region.

Russia and Iran are significant actors in the African cyber landscape, alongside China, intensifying campaigns against African ministries, communications regulators, and critical infrastructure. Russian cyber operators, linked to groups such as the GRU and SVR, are increasingly shifting their focus from European and North American targets to African entities. This change reflects the continent's growing strategic importance as a geopolitical battleground. Similarly, Iranian operators have ramped up their activities, particularly targeting government systems in East and West Africa. For Iran, cyber infiltration offers valuable intelligence, political leverage, and the means to disrupt national digital services. This strategy parallels their operations in the Middle East, where Iranian campaigns blend espionage with operational interference, indicating a willingness to actively influence political processes rather than merely observe them.

Ransomware and infostealers: The commercialisation of African cyber vulnerability

Africa is increasingly facing a wave of commercial cyber exploitation, in addition to geopolitical interference. Ransomware groups, notably RansomHub, Medusa, and BianLian, are focusing their attacks on vulnerable sectors such as healthcare facilities, provincial governments, and public institutions. These entities are easy targets due to reliance on outdated digital systems and inadequate cybersecurity budgets. 

A shift in attack methodology is evident: attackers are moving away from traditional encryption-based lockouts. Instead, they now predominantly use a theft-and-extortion model. This involves stealing highly confidential data and threatening its public release unless a ransom is paid. While this approach has already been observed in attacks on hospitals in North America and Europe, its adoption in Africa is particularly detrimental, exacerbating the severe infrastructural strain already present in many of the continent's health systems.

The proliferation of credential-theft malware, known as "infostealers" like RedLine, StealC, Atlantida, and Lumma represents a significant and often underestimated threat, operating in parallel with ransomware. This is particularly concerning in the African context, where personal devices, often lacking VPNs or robust enterprise security, are commonly used to access corporate systems. A crucial data point highlights the scale of this vulnerability: 70% of compromised devices globally are personal, not corporate assets. Once credentials are stolen, cybercriminals quickly monetize them by reselling access points on dark web markets, providing threat actors with a low-cost entry point into vital infrastructure such as telecom networks, government systems, banking operations, and emerging fintech startups.

Telecommunications: The new strategic battleground

The telecommunications sector stands out as the clearest indicator of Africa's increased cyber vulnerability. Operations by Chinese-linked groups, notably Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, against service providers in Africa reflect their global campaign strategies. The strategic goal is unambiguous: telecommunications networks serve as critical pathways for state intelligence, diplomatic communication, fintech transactions, and military command. Successful infiltration grants immediate intelligence access, the capability for long-term surveillance, manipulation of data streams, and future strategic advantage. With the expansion of 5G systems, cloud interconnections, and digital cross-border trade, these telecom networks are evolving into digital frontiers analogous to national borders, demanding sovereign security measures.

Cybersecurity has to shift from technical concern to national security doctrine

Africa's growing digital landscape, encompassing fintech, e-government platforms, mobile identity systems, and the adoption of public cloud services, is creating new paths for economic growth. However, as highlighted in the 2025 State of Cyber Security Report, this expansion has simultaneously positioned the continent at the epicenter of global digital competition and conflict. The continent faces escalating and urgent threats, primarily from state-sponsored espionage, AI-powered election interference, ransomware campaigns targeting government and public entities, large-scale credential theft, infiltration of critical telecom backbones, and supply-chain compromises impacting core national infrastructure.

To avert the risk of becoming the world's most strategically vulnerable battleground, despite its status as the fastest-growing digital market, African governments must fundamentally change their approach to cybersecurity. This requires elevating it from a mere IT concern to a national security doctrine. Such a doctrine necessitates prioritising budgets, establishing domestic regulation, fostering cross-border cooperation, and developing cyber defence capabilities robust enough to counter sophisticated global adversaries.

Written By: 

*Sesona Mdlokovana

Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group 

Africa Specialist

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