Dr Sizo Nkala

SOUTH Sudan, the world’s youngest country, is in the midst of a deteriorating political crisis which is moving it ever closer to another civil war.

Vice President Riek Machar and his wife, Angelina Teni, who also serves as the Interior Minister, were arrested in the late hours of March 26 at their residence in Juba. The South Sudanese government blamed Vice President Machar for instigating a rebellion against the government with the intention of delaying elections.

President Salva Kiir ordered the arrest of the Vice President and his wife. Machar’s arrest came after renewed fighting between the government forces and the White Army militia in the Upper Nile state in the northern parts of the country. The militia ran over a military base and attacked a United Nations helicopter belonging to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) which had been deployed to rescue the government soldiers.

The fighting claimed about 28 lives and has already displaced about 100 000 people with many fleeing to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya. The White Army militia, which is made up of members of the Nuer ethnic group, is reportedly loyal to Vice President Machar while the government forces are under the control of President Salva Kiir.

In response, Kiir’s government arrested some of Machar’s key allies including the deputy chief of defence, the petroleum minister, the peacebuilding minister, and several senior military figures. Moreover, the governor of the Upper Nile state, who was also a Machar ally, was removed from his position after being accused of being behind the violence in the state.

President Kiir’s South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Vice President Machar’s SPLM In Opposition (SPLM-IO) were the main protagonists in a deadly civil war between 2013 and 2018 which killed an estimated 400,000 people.

The two parties signed a peace deal in 2018 – the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) – which brought the civil war to an end and resulted in the transitional government of national unity.

However, following the arrests of its senior figures, the SPLM-IO has said that peace and stability in the country have been jeopardised and the actions of the government amount to an abrogation of the 2018 peace deal.

The government of national unity has failed to implement some of the key terms of the R-ARCSS which include the integration of forces which fought each other in the civil war into a single national army, the adoption of a new constitution, the setting up of a court to oversee transitional justice and the holding of elections.

The SPLM-IO still retains its military wing – the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) – which has bases across the country. In recent weeks, government troops have been attacking SPLA-IO bases in Juba and the Upper Nile state in a bid to weaken Vice President Machar’s position.

Kiir’s government has expressed its intention to liquidate the SPLA-IO forces and integrate them into the national army. Elections have been repeatedly postponed first from December 2022 to December 2024 and then from December 2024 to December 2026. It is not even certain whether the new 2026 deadline will be upheld but if recent history is anything to go by, it is highly likely that the deadline will not be honoured. Without a permanent constitution in place, holding elections will be impossible.

The possibility of a return to full-scale civil war in the country largely depends on the extent of Machar’s control of the SPLA-IO forces and the various militia like the White Army which fought alongside his forces during the civil war.

Machar’s position has been weakened by desertions and defections within the ranks of the SPLA-IO forces who were left unhappy by Machar’s choices of political appointments in government. It is also not clear whether, after his effective removal from government, Machar will be able to mobilise resources in the form of money, weapons, and ammunition for his forces.

Without access to such resources, Machar’s forces would not be able to mount effective opposition. Kiir seems to be trying to take full advantage of Machar’s weak position to try and gain total control of the country.

He is being aided in this mission by the intervention of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in favour of Kiir’s government early in March. The UPDF has been engaged in a joint bombing campaign with the government forces against the SPLA-IO and the White Army.

The head of the UPDF, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba has posted on one of his social media platforms that he wants Machar “to kneel before our President H.E Salva Kiir”.

The African Union (AU) and Kenya which currently chairs the East African Community (EAC) have been involved in frantic diplomatic efforts to try and de-escalate the tensions.

However, Machar and the SPLA-IO are not Kiir’s only headache. The President also has to deal with the disquiet within his party and forces over the succession battle. Kiir’s ailing health has sparked intense jostling within the SPLM to succeed him.

In the last few months, the president has made major changes in his camp firing the intelligence chief Akol Koor and the second Vice President James Wani Igga replacing them with his close allies.

Former Vice President Igga who also served as the SPLM secretary general was replaced by Kiir’s son in law and businessman – Benjamin Bol. This has certainly rubbed some quarters in the SPLM the wrong way.

Moreover, the declining oil exports which generate 90 percent of the government revenue has left Kiir unable to oil his patronage network while failing to pay civil servants and the soldiers for months. It is reported that some soldiers even refused to be deployed to the Upper Nile state to quell the violence there.

The chaos within the governing party, the SPLM, and the broken relationship between the two major parties and a devastating economic crisis seem to be pushing South Sudan towards the brink of another civil war.

* DR SIZO NKALA A Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Africa-China Studies.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.