President Cyril Ramaphosa leads a cabinet born of compromise, as South Africa’s government of national unity faces its first major political test.
Image: Mauro PIMENTEL / AFP
South Africa’s multi-party government of national unity (GNU), which emerged in the wake of the May 2024 elections, marked a turning point in the country’s political history. It took South Africans back to the 1990s, when the country showed that political opponents could find common cause.
The formation of the government of national unity expressed the hope that the country could do it again.
But just nine months into its term, the good will and pragmatism which marked its formation have worn thin. A major budget impasse between the two major actors, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA), threatens the coalition.
South Africans have long been accustomed to viewing the world of politics, governance and bureaucracy through the lens of a top-down “strong” state – a vicious apartheid state, an East Asia style developmental state, or a collusive “predatory state”.
But as recent analyses we co-authored with others have detailed, the vision of a top-down politically cohesive state no longer fits South Africa’s realities.
The government of national unity promised the hope that the country was embracing an approach that is key to success for almost all inclusive constitutional democracies. That is – abandon “all or nothing” confrontation, and instead pursue pragmatic bargains to achieve mutually agreeable policy outcomes.
At the most basic level, the government of national unity achieved this, at least for a while. The sharing of cabinet ministries between multiple parties created a diverse platform for executive power-sharing that was not dictated by a single dominant party, and which prevented the risks of parties building institutional fiefdoms.
In our view, failure to overcome deeply ingrained political differences could set off a downward spiral in the country.
On governance, the government of national unity created the space to pursue two sets of gains.
The first comprises the potential benefit of bringing together unlikely bedfellows.
The former opposition parties brought into a power-sharing arrangement were bound to be performance-driven, given the country’s long deteriorating government performance and ethical integrity. They had made “good governance” and criticism of the ANC central to their political brands.
New “outsider” eyes brought into formerly cloistered and factionalised ANC-run departments created the possibility of a new urgency to perform.
It’s too soon to tell whether this is happening, but anecdotal evidence suggests there are some green shoots.
The second governance gain comprises the crucial task of building a capable and professional state bureaucracy. The challenges include being able to pay the public sector wage bill, fostering a culture of delivery, and consolidating the bloated network of government departments.
Based on their party manifestos and public utterances, members of the government all aim to professionalise the public service.
Detailed technical work is already happening on issues such as training and competency assessment, transferring powers of appointment from politicians to senior public servants, and instituting checks in the recruitment and selection process. The National Assembly’s recent adoption of the Public Service Commission Bill forms part of this agenda.
But a prolonged legal dispute between the DA and ANC over the latter’s policy of “deploying” party members into state employment risks scuppering progress. It also leaves a key question unanswered: what role, if any, should political parties have in the recruitment and selection of public servants?
The government of national unity has struggled to create effective mechanisms to translate agreement on a broad agenda of policy priorities into specific outcomes. This came at a higher cost than expected.
Still, it has made gains in challenging policy areas. These gains have repeatedly been undermined by the perverse determination of sections within both the ANC and the DA to engage in brinkmanship.
On health, both parties agree on the principle of universalising access. They differ on how to achieve this. But at least one seemingly intractable sticking point has been resolved. Both sides agree that private medical aid schemes need to be retained as part of a broader strategy of pursuing health system reform.
On basic education, the public spat over the Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill overshadows the potential to agree on balancing the autonomy of school governing bodies with the oversight role of provincial departments.
On land expropriation, the emotive rhetoric which followed the signing of the Expropriation Bill and the unwelcome and toxic intervention of international actors has overshadowed technical concerns which can be resolved.
On pro-growth policies: Operation Vulindlela, a joint Presidency and National Treasury initiative to unblock constraints in targeted economic sectors, has made significant strides. It has laid the groundwork for new rounds of growth-supporting infrastructural reforms and has the potential to build cohesion in the government of national unity. However, the DA’s attempt to lobby for a greater role in the strategic oversight of Operation Vulindlela in exchange for supporting the budget risks souring relations with the ANC.
A thriving inclusive society depends on powerful actors visibly committed to co-operation.
For all of the challenges confronting the government of national unity, it was built on a foundation of pragmatism. For the sake of South Africa’s future, it remains vital to build on this foundation. Obsolete top-down governing approaches must go. Pathways to performance must be lifted above political grandstanding. Constructive solutions should supersede ideological rigidity. South Africa has done it before. It can do it again.
Vinothan Naidoo, Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration, University of Cape Town
Brian Levy, Professor of the Practice of International Development, Johns Hopkins University
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